Never Waste a Good Crisis: Solidarity Conflicts in the EU
Stefan Wallaschek and Monika Eigmüller
‘Make Solidarity Great Again’—this was the campaign slogan of the Danish non-governmental organisation Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke as well as the electoral message of the German leftist youth organisation Linksjugend Sachsen in 2017. It could also have been the Leitmotif of the European Union, which stresses solidarity in numerous contexts. Not only are solidarity issues fundamentally inscribed in European treaties and represented in numerous policy areas—energy, foreign affairs, migration and asylum policy—but the need for internal EU solidarity is explicitly affirmed in the ‘solidarity clause’ (article 222) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which upholds mutual solidarity among member states in the face of natural catastrophe or terrorist attack, and in the dedicated ‘solidarity’ section of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
In fact, it now seems we have a new common narrative on ‘European solidarity’, which has replaced the earlier narrative of a European identity. Understood as a combination of structural characteristics and action on issues involving mutual help and reciprocal relations among actors, solidarity is key to the creation and maintenance of sustainable, reliable communities. It creates trust and belonging within a group, and helps the group to deal with uncertainty and perceived threats (Lahusen, 2020). As such, European solidarity encompasses mutual help and reciprocity among Europeans on issues such as social security, labour relations and health.
While national society was long considered the most abstract form of solidarity, in recent decades the search for transnational forms has increased (Gerhards et al, 2020). The EU may well be the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt ever to make solidarity of supranational relevance, to create a postnational community among member states and citizens. The right to move beyond one’s national territory, to work, travel and live in other member states without bureaucratic visa procedures and even to vote in other countries’ local elections—all these rights (and corresponding obligations) form the basis upon which the European citizenry can create a sense of community to enhance further its members’ solidarity. Conversely, the erosion of these rights can prompt ordinary people and political actors to question the validity of the entire integrative project, severely destabilising its legitimacy, vis-à-vis both its ‘inputs’ and its ‘outputs’ (Eigmüller, 2017).
This past decade, solidarity issues have been at the heart of each of the EU’s major crises: the eurozone crisis, Europe’s refugee influx, the Brexit disaster and, most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic. In each case, the essential question was: who will act in solidarity, with whom, to provide what help? Looking at each crisis from a solidarity perspective will help identify the crucial conflicts at the forefront of each. The absence of demonstrable solidarity, moreover, has implications for the current state of affairs and for the future of the European integration project.
The eurozone crisis—or how not to show solidarity
The eurozone crisis started in December 2009, when Greece stated that its figures for public debt were incorrect, sparking suspicion that its state finances were not reliable and speculation by financial actors that it would default. Over the ensuing months, the eurozone failed to react in a community-oriented way. Instead of staying together and offering help to the weakest members of the group (first Greece, then Ireland and Portugal), EU institutions and export-oriented European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, started a ‘blame game’ which judged southern Europeans pejoratively.
The austerity policies pursued—debt reduction through budget cuts, ‘liberalisation’ and deregulation—did not seek recourse to a united front of eurozone members (Blyth, 2014). While risk-sharing and mutual liability are the cornerstone of the common currency and monetary policies, and indeed partially worked to solve the crisis (Schelkle, 2017), the EU’s coping mechanism in this instance was not rooted in the solidarity of member states.
Solidarity in the refugee crisis: publicly present, institutionally absent
Next to come was the refugee crisis. The obligation to act with solidarity features prominently in the migration and asylum section of the Lisbon treaty. Prequels to the events of 2015 were the rising numbers of those seeking asylum in the EU after the ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 and of shipwrecks off the Italian and Maltese coasts. But the Dublin regulations (II and III) could not sustain the burden of such a massive increase of asylum claims in a short period, since they placed the locus of decision-making power at the EU external borders in the east and south. The EU was unable to agree an EU-wide relocation scheme (a burden-sharing mechanism), while border control and surveillance were tightened.
The involvement of many political actors, commentators and civil-society groups made ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We can do this’) from the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the hashtag #refugeeswelcome the main slogans of 2015. On the flip side of the Wilkommenskultur in many European countries, observers witnessed an emerging politics of demarcation, of ‘security’, as well a rise in xenophobia from such right-wing actors as the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, the Lega leader in Italy, Matteo Salvini, and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) (Wallaschek, 2020).
In short, the EU and its member states failed to resolve the crisis in a solidaristic manner, by reforming the Dublin regulations, and failed to institutionalise a new mechanism which would prevent its repetition. While solidarity was publicly present in the debates, the EU failed to institutionalise it in a strong and coherent way.
Brexit: ‘national sovereignty’, not European solidarity
The 2016 referendum on the UK’s EU membership was a landmark in the European integration project (Hobolt, 2016). Leaving aside all the incorrect and misleading information from the Brexiters, the false promises and hopes raised, the outcome of the referendum served to emphasise the priority of national sovereignty over supranational governance and community-based decision-making among member states. The key slogan ‘take back control’ depicted the EU and its complex, multi-level institutional system as a ‘super-state’ which overregulated politics to the detriment of the British people.
The UK’s decision to leave can however also be seen as opting for a national(istic) version of solidarity, detecting an erosion of the social bond and a transformation of the economy, as well as a reaction to multiple crises in housing, health and the labour market. Right-wing and Eurosceptic actors exploited this social uncertainty and economic deprivation, spread misinformation and built on a strong ‘we’-feeling, based on Britishness and racism to create an ‘ingroup’ that felt threatened by the EU.
Covid-19: from national to European solidarity and back
For most countries worldwide, the Covid-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented health crisis—yet one that the EU, with its collective and solidarity-based model of governance, should have been uniquely qualified to resolve. Its 27 member states already had the needed capacities, economic power and political stability to help each other. By joining forces, they could have found ways to resolve the crisis, which had hit each of them hard. In the special case of Covid-19, solidarity-based action would also have been uniquely justifiable under article 222 of the TFEU: ‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’.
Nevertheless, the EU ignored this legal underpinning and failed to tap its unique potential to deploy collective resources and pursue solidarity-based action. Instead, the union addressed the crisis primarily as a domestic issue, leading to conflicts among member states over the distribution of medical goods. After a few months, the EU’s relevance increased as a hub through which member states could co-ordinate efforts and pool resources to develop a vaccine. Underlying this emergent dynamic was the implicit understanding that, in a densely networked world, supranational co-ordination and knowledge-sharing were needed to control Covid-19 and manage its social consequences.
Despite this, the EU’s establishment in the summer of 2020 of a fund to support strongly affected countries, such as Italy or Spain, led to further tensions and conflicts over how to support crisis-hit countries (and how this should be financed). The question of who should act in solidarity with whom, and under which circumstances, was once more to the fore.
Without solidarity, everything is nothing
The etymology of ‘crisis’ connotes not only a state of uncertainty but also a decisive moment. A crisis is a liminal phase—a transitional moment before a change, when things can get better or worse. Does the EU have the capacity to cope with these various multi-layered decisive moments? So far, the union has not shown itself capable of solving any of the crises. As soon as a fire was put out in one area another would pop up elsewhere, which further questioned the legitimacy and future of the integration project. Any ideas about restructuring and reforming the EU were not only put on hold due to the crises but were also hindered by electoral cycles in influential member states and in the European Parliament, due to changing party constellations (especially in connection with the rise of right-wing populist parties) in many countries. Thus reforms were always on the horizon, but never a viable option.
Yet it we take seriously the intensification of societal cleavages and conflicts within the EU, the fundamental architecture of the union must not only shift towards solidarity—it must acknowledge that, without solidarity, everything is nothing. And this is possible: we observe signs of solidarity in each crisis but this potential for solidary action is largely untapped. It should be openly addressed in public debates (input legitimacy) and implemented in ways that enable European citizens to experience the social bond solidarity measures can engender (output legitimacy).
First, economic policies should stress the social-rights dimension. The EU is not just a common market in which capital can move freely; it is also a common social space which is shaped by interactions among people whose rights and obligations should be supported. This dimension should be stressed in legislation and publicly supported by political actors, including the European Commission and the European Parliament.
Secondly, as long as the EU wants to maintain the principle of open borders among member states, it needs to reform the Dublin regulations by, among other measures, creating a refugee quota system and a relocation scheme. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU includes basic human rights, such as the right to asylum and safe shelter. A real, solidarity-based, European-wide asylum system must be established.
Thirdly, Brexit has highlighted the vulnerability of the European idea. Arguably, its most important lesson is that, to achieve a stable, pro-union majority in European societies, the core promise to harmonise living conditions across Europe (or at least come close to it) must be kept. This requires intergovernmental solidarity and a certain level of redistribution within and among member states.
Fourthly, and finally, with Covid-19 the EU and its member states have a rare opportunity to make the union a real winner by setting up an EU-wide health fund. For this, the funds raised by the proposed digital tax or a tax on financial transactions could be used to underpin a union-wide health policy. This could support local public-health infrastructures, regions hit hardest by the pandemic and research.
Such a step would have significant potential to shift public perceptions in favour of the EU. It would enable ordinary citizens to experience the union not as a force that intervenes in or regulates their social lives but rather as a positive force that supports them and makes their lives easier in this devastating situation. In her ‘State of the Union’ address in September, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented initial plans for an EU based on the principles of solidarity—showing that the commission now recognised the need for that to be enhanced. The Covid-19 crisis has once again demonstrated the need for solidarity, since the economic interdependencies among EU member states are simply too great to accept egoistic state action.
References
Blyth, M (2015), Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Eigmüller, M (2017), ‘Beyond the crisis: the societal effects of the European transformation’, European Law Journal 23, 5: 350-60
Gerhards, J, H Lengfeld, ZS Ignácz, FK Kley and M Priem (2020), European Solidarity in Times of Crisis: Insights from a Thirteen-country Survey, London: Routledge
Hobolt, SB (2016), ‘The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent’, Journal of European Public Policy 23, 9: 1259-77
Lahusen, C (ed) (2020), Citizens’ Solidarity in Europe: Civic Engagement and Public Discourse in Times of Crises, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Schelkle, W (2017), The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding the Euro Experiment, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Wallaschek, S (2020), ‘Contested solidarity in the euro crisis and Europe’s migration crisis: a discourse network analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy 27, 7: 1034-53