Europe Will Be Social or There Will Be No Europe!
For almost a decade the European Union has apparently been in a constant state of crisis. The concept of ‘European crisis’ appears more than just overworked. The lines of conflict that have emerged during this period within the European community of nations have become more and more chaotic. North against south, older versus newer member states, renationalization tendencies against the desire for deeper integration, populists versus progressives, centre against periphery. Looking at France these days reveals the consequences this polarization can exert within individual member states. The occasionally violent Yellow Vest protests that have been going on across the whole of France for months now exemplify in shocking manner the malaise of the European crisis. The originally leaderless, diffuse protest movement sees itself nevertheless united in a feeling of hopelessness in the face of a political system that does not seem to be in any position to mitigate its hardships in any meaningful way. Rage is expressed against the rising cost of living that a population from mainly rural, economically poor regions can no longer tolerate. The question of social inequality is thereby raised to a central issue for the EU’s future.
A Europe of social inequalities
Social classes have today become a European phenomenon, or to put it another way: there is a European ‘underdog class’ of the so-called losers of modernization, a European middle class and a European upper stratum, and these three classes can be found equally in all European countries so that one can no longer say, as one could in the 1960s, that, for example, Germany is overall richer than, say, Italy. Similarly, in all western but also eastern European states we find a growing concentration of wealth that boosts social inequalities. The third element that hugely boosts social inequality in Europe is the migration of labour from east to west Europe, most of all in the lower wage segment. Thomas Faist speaks in his extensive empirical investigation of de facto a form of European wage slavery, meaning cheap labour from eastern Europe that works as, say, asparagus harvester, nanny or construction worker. Societal processes and social transformations have long been underway that have the effect that social classes take on European dimensions and can no longer be sorted on national lines.
If we are increasingly dealing today with the question and/or analysis of social inequalities in Europe and how we can, where appropriate, mitigate and/or combat them then – this shall be my hypothesis – this is because we are indirectly asking whether we will become a European society and whether we can and wish to build a European democracy as such. That would de facto presuppose that we no longer regard social inequalities in Europe as a national but as a European problem and therefore offset them via transnational mechanisms. And that, after setting up a European market and a European currency, we are now turning to the question of whether we can become an equally integrated European society – and what would be required to do so.
That is indeed the current argument in various debates such as in the loud and salient talk about a so-called ‘transfer union’. The political debate about a ‘transfer union’ is basically an expression for the process of European socialization we are going through now but for which we have so far failed to find the proper political description. Concretely put: there is in Germany right now a debate raging about Italy's transgression of EU budget deficit rules; at the same time, you read in the German press the growing argument that of course there must be a minimum income in Italy (which does not have one) and one has, on the whole, understanding for the Italian government's wish to raise public spending. This discussion shows that Europe's citizens slowly but surely are seeing the connection between a currency union as ‘partnership agreement’ and social inequalities in Europe. Indeed, it demonstrates how important it is to put the national perspective and national statistics to one side since they no longer do justice to this process of European socialization.
Whereas about a decade ago, i.e. before the banking and euro crisis, we debated in Europe along essentially national lines – pitting mainly a ‘rich’ Germany against a ‘poor’ Greece or Portugal; or a ‘rich’ Germany against a ‘poor’ Czech Republic – today we can see much more often that the real socio-economic differences in Europe reside between centre and periphery and between urban and rural. In other words, the region around Milan looks economically as good as Frankfurt or Lyon but, on the other hand, Anklam is performing economically as badly as the Ardèche or Andalusia.
For a few years now social scientists have also begun to view social data and differences no longer on a country-by-country but increasingly European aggregate basis. A pioneering work here is Dimitris Ballas, Danny Dorling and Benjamin Henning's ‘Social Atlas of Europe’ where various social data – on health, education, old-age poverty – are illustrated on European maps without national borders. That's all very good and interesting because one learns that national origin – Finnish, German or Portuguese – is not the decisive factor behind the number of heart attacks in a country or of unwanted pregnancies among 14-year-old girls. _Cum grano sali_s, one can say across Europe as a whole that the differences between European countries, i.e. nation states, have become minimal but the class differences within individual European countries have become so much the greater. Europe as a ‘societas’, as a society or as a ‘sociology’, is by itself a new trend in European social sciences and that means, of course, that one can no longer simply view Europe institutionally (as political scientists do – which structures dominate/hold sway in the EU?) but increasingly think about its people or citizens as a whole. This trend has, indeed, long been European and not just visible in German-language literature. Social scientists have performed great preliminary work in basically rethinking and/or collectively thinking about European social policy – as I'd like to set out conceptually below.
Fundamentally, the mobility available in today's Europe is to be welcomed if Europe, the EU, is to be a space for the free movement of people, goods, capital and services. On the other hand, this is putting high demands on EU social policy in the coming years if one is to meet the challenges of this European mobility with regard to educational opportunities, access to the labour market, entitlements to sickness and other social benefits. As long as social policy continues to come mainly under national political and fiscal management the very social inequalities one thereby laments arise throughout Europe. If Polish workers in England for example can be contracted to work for two years as any longer appointment would mean being transferred to the British social security system, if a Romanian nanny may indeed work in Berlin but will get no unemployment benefit if she loses her job, then one should not be surprised at the populist currents in east Europe that are becoming one of the great political problems facing the EU. And if the single market de facto encourages processes of concentration then the question arises as to how Europe intends dealing with the social injustices this creates – and what institutional and budgetary room for manoeuvre and/or scope for intervention the EU actually has to tackle, mitigate and overcome the social crisis or social inequalities in Europe. Very few right now!
Social and European crises
Today's social crisis is tomorrow's European crisis or, more precisely, the crisis of European democracy. This is one more reason for urgently dealing with social injustices in Europe or, put another way: l'Europe sera social ou ne sera pas! Europe will be social or it won't exist! Marine Le Pen used the following phrase in her election campaigns on virtually every market square: ‘Quand il n'y a plus la nation, qui s'occupera des pauvres?’ When there's no more nation who will bother about the poor? This sentence hits precisely the correlations between social Europe and populism. It says that if Europe does not care for the poor then it has no chance. At the moment, indeed, state welfare benefits such as dole money are paid out at national level. Social injustices in Europe in the end, therefore, so runs a core thesis, are the outcome of a (non-existent) concept of European citizenship that should make European women and men equal before the law and hence social laws.
This is also and perhaps even above all about the political translation of the social crisis in Europe – and this social crisis arises inter alia through the social (and legal) unequal treatment of women and men – into European populism. Here Europe actually means, based loosely on Stefan Zweig, ‘no discrimination on grounds of nationality’. Unfortunately, Europe is still far from tackling social injustices by transcending nationality.
What matters here is that the battle for Europe is conducted on a pan-European basis, though the political structures do not yet mirror this: on 7 February 2018 the introduction of so-called transnational lists in the European Parliament failed largely through the votes of the conservative EPP. Where the political front-line has long been pan-European and transnational, the structures always constrict political arguments at the same time within national, democratic corsets: there are no veritable transnational lists in Europe nor a European party statute; the current European parties are merely associations of national parties. Putting it another way, there is political pressure on national party systems throughout Europe to organise in a European manner. One might even say: a political process in Europe is bursting national party systems apart and European democracy is seeking how to break new ground and/or form a new political body at European level.
This European politicization is new. The rather technocratic or functional character of the EU in law has so far never seriously been questioned. But today the legitimacy bases of the EU are the focus of criticism. Today almost every European state, its party systems and societies are split over the question: what do you think of Europe? This question has replaced the left-right political schema: France is split along the dividing line Macron v Marine Le Pen, Italy has collapsed into two parts, Great Britain is split into #Remain and #Brexit/Leave, Poland into PiS-supporters and opponents, Germany into #PulseofEurope and #Pegida etc. The question of Europe has thereby become the structural question of all national democracies in Europe and the question is now posed whether the 27 or 28 national democracies in today's EU can be transferred into a common European democracy so that the pan-European political debate can be pursued institutionally as well at European level and no longer pressed into national pathways. And, if so, how?
A Question of Sovereignty
‘All sovereignty comes from the people’ is stated in many constitutions of individual EU member states. As Kurt Tucholsky might put it: ‘And where does it go?’ In fact, the sovereignty of the political subjects of the EU, that is the citizens of Europe, is buried as it were in the European Council, hard to fathom, non-transparent and also only indirectly legitimized. So, if you wish to ponder about European sovereignty and/or break through the united front of EU and EU member states with regard to sovereignty – understood as legislative capability – then the core issue is the abolition of the European Council and the re-evaluation of the sovereignty of Europe's women and men as political subjects by making the EU system, including the separation of powers, wholly parliamentary. This would erase the oft-bemoaned democratic deficit.
Resolving the question of sovereignty in favour of Europe's citizens in Europe's political system significantly breaks down, however, because they do not share the same legal equality across Europe as a whole, neither in elections, nor in taxation nor in access to social rights, that is above all in the areas that make up their status as citizens. The basic assumption behind the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, i.e. that the EU is a ‘union of states’ and a ‘union of citizens’, still awaits the back-up to become the norm. De facto, the EU is simply a ‘union of states’ and not yet a ‘union of citizens’ precisely because the general political principle does not apply equally for all European citizens, women as well as men.
In a European democracy – in so far as one really strives for one – it would be imperative for the citizenry to decide together within one electoral body, founded on the general political principle of equality. In his famous book ‘Le Sacre du Citoyen’ the French sociologist Pierre Rosanvallon writes that what makes citizens into a single polity is no less than the act of ‘general, equal, direct and secret voting’. Currently, the European Parliament is generally and directly elected in secret but not equally as the principle ‘one person one vote’ does not apply – indeed, that is the source of the pertinent criticism of the German constitutional court vis-a-vis the democratic (in)adequacy of the European Parliament. The first concrete step towards building a European democracy would be the creation of a pan-European election register that would list all Europe's citizens who are registered in the (still) 28 member states on an alphabetic (A to Z) basis. Now, would that be so hard?
It often goes unnoticed in public discourse that many commonplace European demands, e.g. for improving eurozone governance, cannot function without legitimacy back-up. The oft-quoted, much-highlighted creation of, say, a ‘euro finance minister’ or of a ‘eurozone budget’ – core demands of Emmanuel Macron – could only come to pass if the aforesaid euro finance minister had to fully answer for her/his euro budget before a parliament; and this parliament would have to be based upon electoral equality that currently does not exist in the EP. Not without reason is, since Magna Carta, the right to pass a budget the highest legal right of any parliament, one intrinsically tied to tax-raising capacity (‘the right to tax’) and, finally, to the very legitimacy of the parliament (‘_no taxation without repres_entation’) and the general principle of political equality (‘one person one vote’). None of that is a given in the current EU structure. The achievement of these three classic democratic principles in Europe would, therefore, be key to a European democracy and/or the transformation of the traditional EU legal entity into a European democracy. In this regard, this is less about ‘recreating Europe’ than complementing the EU with a single decisive component, that is, the general political principle of equality for all citizens of Europe.
Europe as social union
Here I should like to get to grips with two concepts/definitions. The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk speaks, for example, about ‘welfare patriotism’. Coined using the above-mentioned phrase from Marine Le Pen, this means that Europe must de facto develop a form of welfare patriotism if it is literally to feed or indeed care for its citizens in line with the old principle ‘cuius regio, eius religio’. A European welfare patriotism would be, e.g., a European unemployment insurance scheme or a European minimum wage or indeed a European minimum income. In reality, Europe is miles away from that although an intense debate about it is under way. (A particularly prominent foray here was the demand expressed by SPD finance minister Olaf Scholz last October). Concrete plans for a European unemployment insurance scheme, like those of the German economist Sebastian Dullien, have been lodged, what's more, at the European Commission since 2014 but rejected so far by the European Council. That brings us right back to the core issue of an absent, legally underpinned European citizenship since a European unemployment insurance policy/scheme would have to be based upon equal treatment in law of all EU citizens – but that cannot be implemented transnationally as the law now stands. Had there been a European unemployment insurance scheme in place youth unemployment in southern Europe during the crisis might well have been much better cushioned. But, then, the EU and/or eurozone did not have what experts call a ‘fiscal clip’ as intimated already in the section ‘fiscal union’ of the 2012 EU report ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’.
Here I come to my central point: There can be no European social union in prospect on the basis of the equal treatment of all EU citizens in social legislation unless, at the same time, the issues of a European fiscal union and, with that, a budgetary and taxation union are addressed. If you want to combat social inequality then this, of course, requires jobs and growth on the one hand and, on the other, tax monies to provide a safety net for social inequalities, ensure equal opportunities, enable access to education and training etc. ‘The state can tax’ is the oldest definition of statehood. But the EU is not a state. So, the discussion about a European social policy is as important as it is dangerous by pointing to the heart of a European statehood that would still have to be created – but, in a period of renationalization when European solidarity is in poor shape, one should not talk so loudly about that, of course.
As mentioned at the start, it is now time to 'Europeanise' the concept of social class since it refers to the process of European socialisation. This demand is, inter alia, supported through the book published in October 2017, ‘Les Classes sociales en Europe’ (Social Classes in Europe). Data within it not only point to a cross-border rapprochement in the living standards of the three different social classes but to a transnational ‘class shift’ within Europe: western Europe has shifted its ‘underclass’ to eastern Europe. That might make sense from the viewpoint of economic efficiency but is no way to build a European democracy in the form of a political union since it can hardly come as a surprise that east Europeans, who often feel ‘second-class’ Europeans, go off and vote for populists as a reaction to being downgraded in that way.
An appropriate reaction to these effects of a process of European socialisation that boost cross-border social inequalities in Europe, between east and west, north and south, urban and rural and centre and periphery – and this is the core thesis of this paper – would not be to stick to the measures taken at the social summit in Gothenburg even if they're a good start. But the ca. 300 million euros, made available as project funds to be managed nationally, do not amount to a structural transfer of social policy to the EU level precisely on the lines of the aforementioned ‘cuius regio, eius religio’. Were that to happen or even be considered, a European social policy to counter social inequalities in Europe on a sustainable basis can only be thought of prospectively within a context of an EU tax, fiscal and budgetary policy or put it another way: there would need to be fiscal federalism, a European financial statute, to be up to this task in its true dimension. This structural debate must always be borne in mind if one wants to go beyond ex-post social tinkering in Europe.
The issue of European inequalities relates to that of EU social statehood and this again, ultimately, to that of European statehood, including budgetary authority that would have to fall to the European Parliament. We would then be spelling out a European statehood, including EU citizenship, that would have to put into practice the general political principle of equality for all EU citizens. Core problems of current social inequalities in Europe – e.g. discrimination against east Europeans – would disappear at a stroke.
Europe as nation?
Marcel Mauss, the French 19th century sociologist, writing in his book ‘The nation or the sense of the social’, defined the nation as follows_:_ ‘A nation is a group of individuals, aware of their mutual economic and social dependence, who decide to translate this mutual dependence into collective control over the state and its economic system’. Why shouldn't Europe as a whole be at precisely this point? Maybe the social inequalities in Europe are merely a call to think of Europe as a commonwealth with all the consequences that I have enumerated; and Europe, in the Marcel Mauss definition – even though all the talk is of re-nationalization – is actually going through the process of becoming a nation.
If Europe is truly, as often discussed and demanded, to become a democracy then the price must be paid: the general political principle of equality for all its citizens. All the more so because, according to empirical studies, the citizens would have no objections to the principle of general equality under the law applying also in social or fiscal questions, as for example a European unemployment insurance policy.
This would add the legal equality of European citizens as political subjects to the equal treatment of goods in the single market and monetary equality (euro): this would be the basis for a European democracy and the leap into a European Republic. After the euro and IBAN numbers must come the immediate prospect of a common European electoral register from A to Z, for example in time for the European elections of 2024; then a European social security and/or tax number (ESSN) for all Europeans alike. European solidarity would then become institutionalised and no longer random. This could come in the form of a deadline set aside for, say, January 2025 as was the case with the euro and IBAN-number. There could even be the guarantee that the ESSN, for example, would only apply to those born after its date of entry and all other European citizens would remain within their national systems. This would be a quasi-organic transition to a politicized and common EU judicial space and community of citizens equal under the law, a.k.a. a commonwealth of citizens or even a European Republic. Constitutional experts should examine whether this would require treaty change. It would be the great reformation of Europe!
In this new or rather completed Europe – one market, one currency, one democracy – the citizens would be the sovereign authority of a political system, all would be equal before the law, parliament decides and there would be separation of powers. The general political principle of equality is the fundament of all democracies, their necessary if not always sufficient condition. One must only recall the definition of nation given by Theodor Schieder who remarked back in 1963: ‘Nation, that means first and foremost a community of citizens, not language, ethnicity or culture’.
Is that so radical? No, not at all: if you read the 1944 manifesto of the Italian anti-fascists at Ventotene you will find therein this very demand for European citizenship. And Jean Monnet also said: ‘Europe does not mean integrating states but uniting citizens’. But those who embrace the status of legal equality, that is accept the general political principle of equality whatever one's origins – in Cicero's classic definition – found a republic. After a single market and a single currency the time has now come to make a start on building a common democracy in Europe as a shared goal of completing the European Project in the 21st century.